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Abstract
The paper analyses the current state of liberalisation and regulation of the energy sector in Europe. It
examines the challenges emerging from gradual liberalisation of the EU energy market and the
relationship between competition and regulation. On the basis of experience gained so far, main winners
and losers from the liberalisation process are identified.
Further, the paper examines specific features related to the process of integration towards the EU.
Generally, in the process of integration towards the EU, it is necessary to develop functioning market
economy and capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. In
addition, the candidates have to accept the entire acquis, including competition policy and the EU
criteria for state aid allocation. Since the EU energy market is being liberalised, the alignment process is
quite complicated - candidates have to gradually liberalise market, while keeping it regulated in order to
ensure public service.
Finally, the paper examines whether and how the energy trade in Europe will be changed after the EU
enlargement, and to what extent these effects can be regarded as trade creation and trade diversion.
1. Introduction
Trade is an economic activity. Energy trade requires political commitment. That indicates that energy
sector is somehow specific.
Indeed, energy sector is strategic one. It is relevant for state security and engages environmental issues.
It is at the core of economic activities and therefore considered to be a key factor for Europe’s
competitiveness and economic development.
On the one hand, strategic importance of the sector, questions of sovereignty and control over natural
resources, particularly as this impacts the security of supply, as well as “natural” monopolistic structure
of network industries have impeded implementation of market – mechanisms in the energy sector as
well as international trade. The sector has been protected, suffered from state interventions and price
distortions that gave to the consumers misleading signals. On the other hand, energy it is the sector that
has an international character either by virtue of participants or by the location of the resources being
exploited. International energy co-operation is necessity, since it is the only way to tackle environmental
problems, ensure political stability and growth of the world markets. No country has been able to
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achieve, or can logically expect to achieve, energy self- sufficiency in isolation from world markets.
Therefore, there is necessity for energy trade. In order to enable trade, the potentially competitive part
sector has to be liberalised for which transparent, non-discriminatory and enforceable trade rules are
required. If competition is to be introduced, the “monopolistic” part has to be regulated.
2. Liberalisation of the EU energy sector
2.1. Institutional framework
The integration process, which led to the formation of the European Union, had begun in the energy
sector. Institutions aimed at co-operation in the energy sector have developed into institutions aimed at
integration of Europe. The outcome is surprising: the dividing barriers were eliminated almost
everywhere but in energy, leaving the sector outside the mainstream developments of the Community,
i.e. creation of the single market.
The European Commission proposed creation of an internal market for electricity and gas in the second
half of 1980s, with view of creation of a single energy market.
Establishment of the single energy market became a part of the energy policy, and one of its priorities.
The creation of the single energy market has gradually proceeded. In the first phase, which begun in
1990-s measures were taken to ensure the transparency of prices to final consumers and to facilitate the
transit of gas and electricity between the Community’s major grids. In the second phase, starting in
1993, production and transportation opened to new entrants on non-discriminatory basis, by introducing
non-discriminatory licensing system. Vertically integrated electricity undertakings unbundled, and the
concept of third party access was introduced on limited basis.
In the third phase, launched in 1996, the gradual opening of the markets (for electricity, and later for
gas) was required. Common rules that enabled free movement within the Community were adopted. In
electricity third party access became responsibility of the network operators. Further, the Electricity
Directive (Directive 96/02/EC), Article 19, layed down minimum market opening. In the fist phase,
from February 1999 a minimum market opening of 27% had to be realised. From February 2000 this
minimum percentage was increased to 30%, and in February 2003 market opening has to reach a
minimum of 35%. These minimum percentages are calculated according to the average consumption in
the EU of electricity consumed by final consumers of over 40 GWh (step 1) of over 20GWH (step 2) and
more than 9 GWh in the final step (step 3) provided by the Directive. By 2006 further market opening
should be discussed. The Gas Directive (Directive 98/30/EC) required opening of the market equal to at
least 20% of total annual gas consumption of the national gas market in 2000. This percentage shall
increase to 28% in five years, and to 33% thereof 20 years after the entry into force of the Directive.
The Lisbon European Council (23-24 March 2000) called for the faster and complete opening of energy
markets. Therefore in March 2001 the Commission proposed a set of new measures to open up the gas
and electricity markets fully by 2005. The proposal concern the degree of market opening (“quantitative
proposals” ) and the minimum obligations regarding access to the network, consumer protection,
regulation and unbundling of the transmission and distribution function in integrated gas and electricity
companies (“qualitative proposals”).
In addition to the liberalisation of national energy and gas market, the proposal included setting up the
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conditions for access to the network for cross-border trade in electricity. The proposal included
measures aimed at reinforcing the conditions which encourage real and fair competition, and
introducing a genuine single market. Such integrated market should be able to avoid type of problems
the US faced in California. The liberalisation and regulation should, in other words, “contribute to
security of supply, quality, consumer protection, environment, while at the same time they should bring
real benefits in terms of competition, price and competitiveness” (Palacio, 2001.). The proposal was
amended in June 2002, and the text should be adopted in the course of 2002.
2.2. Implementation
The establishment of the internal energy market can be evaluated on the basis of the “institutional” and
“functional” performance of the EU member states. Institutional criterion for the establishment of the
internal energy market is compliance with the EU acquis, i.e. implementation of directives. The
functional indicator concerns the development of market as such and the impact of market opening on
related important policy fields, such as public service objectives, environment and security of supply.
The key “institutional” requirement imposed by the electricity and gas directives is degree of opening of
the market.
In electricity sector, all the member states have chosen to open up a larger share of their markets. Four
member states, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the UK have already completely opened their market,
whereas another six member states, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and Spain will
move by 2005 to full market opening.
The implementation of gas directive is less successful. Three member states, Germany, France and
Luxembourg, have still not implemented the directive into national legislation. Further, for Greece and
Portugal minimum opening of 33% is assumed for 2008 and “later”. Finland, too, has certain
derogations in place. Still, on average (on weighted volume basis) approx. 66% of the electricity market
and 79% of the total EU gas demand was in principle opened in 2000.
However, formal market opening is not sufficient guarantee of choice, i.e. competition.
The current degree of market opening provides only an indication of the real degree of competition.
Namely, being an eligible customer does not necessarily guarantee real choice of supplier. For instance,
if supply side competition is to be introduced, investments are required. The transparent and
non-discriminatory rules applicable for new investment are therefore necessary for creation of
competition. In addition, even if these investments take place, a high level of market power of existing
generation companies may impose barriers to new entrants (e.g. with high imbalance charges). Other
issues that are necessary for competition to be real include non-discriminatory access to the network and
effective dispute settlement mechanisms. Still, formally non-discriminatory, but excessively high
network tariffs discourage third party access and may provide revenue for cross subsidy. Similarly,
network tariff structures that are not published in advance may lead to uncertainty and create costly and
time-consuming disputes. This can be avoided in full ownership unbundling takes place. Further, since
reciprocity principle is allowed, the “protective” behaviour of one member state can impede market
development in neighbouring states.
The measure of the competition I use for the purpose of this paper is the level of customer choice and
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ultimately price levels. Two reports (Eurostat, 2000a, Eurostat, 2000b) show a general downward trend
in electricity price levels across the EU. The highest share of consumer switched the supplier in the UK
and Sweden (European Commission, 2001,b). The UK and Sweden are also among the countries in
which the prices dropped significantly. On the other hand, in Greece and Spain, i.e. in countries in
which consumers did not (Greece) or switched a supplier to very limited extent (less than 5% in Spain)
the prices increased. Greece also failed to implement directives successfully.
The Commission’s Report shows a strong correlation between implementation of directives and the
level of customer choice and price levels. The shortcomings in the implementation of directives can be
classified as follows: insufficient regulator power, inadequate unbundling, high network tariffs,
balancing regime, dominant incumbent and cross border issues (European Commission, 2001,b).
Namely, the member states which have adopted policies along the lines of the Commission’s proposals
have experienced better performance of the electricity market in terms of customers exercising the right
to choose, and reduced prices.
The further liberalisation of the market requires additional measures that ensure effective
implementation. These include establishment of regulatory structures, and (in case of electricity) a tariff
system for cross-border transactions.
3. Competition and Regulation - Friends or Foes?
Liberalisation of the energy markets is limited by public service obligations. Competition is limited by
degree of liberalisation and the fact that in the supply chain there are activities that are considered as
naturally monopolistic (transmission and distribution network level).
The EU member states can define public service obligations in the general economic interest within five
categories, related to environmental considerations, security, regularity, quality of supply constraint, and
pricing policy considerations. In electricity and gas sector, there is a common set of provisions that
regulate activities of companies under the public service obligation. These provisions can be listed in
three broad categories. The first is related to universal service, the second concerns the protection of
environment, and the third relates to security of supply considerations.
The concept of universal service contains the right to be connected to a grid, the right to be supplied, the
right to be supplied with high quality service, the right to be supplied with high quality service at
affordable prices, and the right to receive high standards of customer service.
The monopoly network operator has the obligation to provide universal service. The opening up of the
market is not immediately linked to this obligation.
The obligation to connect customers (i.e. to guarantee the right to be supplied) is the corollary of the
monopoly situation (in the case of captive customers). The competition (supply for eligible customers)
is viewed as the mean of achieving the obligation to connect customers, and to help meeting the
obligation to supply customers with high quality service at affordable prices. National authorities
supervise that the competition fulfils these aims, and regulation is introduced as “safety net”. Regulation
is aimed at preventing unreasonable prices being charged by companies enjoying a strong or dominant
position is a particular market area. This can take the form of licence conditions, compensation
mechanisms, criminal penalties etc.
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Liberalisation also supports environmental protection and security of supply. For instance, competitive
pressure leads to a more rapid replacement of inefficient electricity generation by new and far less
polluting plants. Increased market integration provides higher level of supply security, subject to the
limits on physical interconnection capacity.
In the case of electricity, there are three key aspects that can be raised regarding security of supply:
system security in terms of network infrastructure; supply security in terms of ensuring the existence of
adequate generation capacity and the supply security in term of the primary energy source to generation
(gas, coal, etc.). The liberalisation improves security in terms of ensuring generation capacity, which is
ensured by the market and in terms of primary energy source to generation. The transmission system is
the meeting point in the competitive market. But the market integration (for which liberalisation is
needed) can decrease investments and operating costs. Development of electricity trade enables the
power systems to meet hourly electric load and customers’ annual requirements using a least-cost mix
of generating sources. Therefore, on the one hand liberalisation contributes to meet the public service
obligation to supply at affordable prices. However, with lower prices resulting from liberalisation, a
number of complementary policies become increasingly important, in particular with respect to the
increase of share of green energy, energy efficiency, security of supply etc.
In conclusion, the public service obligations imposed to “natural monopoly” (such as obligation to
connect to the grid, the obligation to supply high quality service which are imposed to network operator)
are not immediately linked to the process of market opening (liberalisation).
Competition contributes to meeting the public service obligation linked to the potentially competitive
activities (the obligation to be supplied, at affordable prices and to receive high standards of customers
service). Regulation is in this respect introduced as a safety net, and mainly takes form of minimum
rules, standards of performance and compensation mechanism. The public service obligations impede
liberalisation, while the regulation of monopolistic activities enables competition.
Liberalisation is necessary to enable competition. However, it is not sufficient since there are “naturally
monopolistic” activities. Further, historical development led to creation of vertically integrated
monopolies. Although they are being unbundled, some utilities still have dominant (or quite strong)
position. In order to encourage new entrants, reduce possibilities for exercising market power and
enable competition, rules are necessary. These rules are implemented through regulation mechanisms.
So, in order to create competition, regulation is necessary not only in “monopolistic” part of the sector,
but also in the potentially competitive, at least until the competitive markets are established.
Namely, market-based approaches complement the traditional network focuses of regulatory control, but
they cannot on their own provide a complete substitute. None of market failures is solved through
liberalisation and competition.
Further market liberalisation, appropriate regulation, improved use of existing networks and completion
of missing links are complementary measures that will increase efficiency and competition, and ensure
adequate level of quality, as well as reduced congestion and thus enhanced sustainability.
4. Winners and losers
The liberalisation process already brought some benefits for customers: the prices decrease, and there is
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a choice. Further, liberalisation gave an opportunity to private investors to invest. Historically, investors
in energy sector were national governments or state/public owned enterprises. Their main interest was to
ensure energy resources, e.g. to provide public service indispensable for economic activity. The main
goal of the private investors is to gain income or capital appreciation, i.e. to maximise profits.
Therefore, the privatisation may, through change of ownership structure (transformation of public
monopoly into private one) lead to greater abuse of market power. This is the main argument for
regulating monopolies.
But, by selling assets to private investors, governments (first in Britain, and then across much of Europe)
gained three advantages: they raised money to pay for other public expenditure (or to finance tax cuts),
they created balance sheets for the privatised companies which could be geared up to pay for future
investment; and, through regulation, they created vehicles for transferring wider policy objectives to
utilities, and hence to customers’ bill rather than though their tax returns. None of these three advantages
was necessarily one which enhanced efficiency. That remained an empirical issue (Helm, 2001).
The liberalisation can therefore be regarded as beneficial for both consumers and state.
Still, the improved efficiency caused reduction in employment. The 1998 Employment in Europe Report
(European Commission, 1998) showed electricity and gas industries to be among the sectors most
affected by reduction in employment. Based on European and national statistics, it has been estimated
that over 250,000 jobs have been lost in the sector between 1990 and 1998. Trade unions estimate that a
further reduction in employment of 25% is likely over the next five years. The employment reduction
affected mostly ageing technical male workforce with traditional expectation for a “job for life”. On the
other hand, since the industry has had traditionally low emphasis on marketing and customer services
these are areas that offer job creation – still, certainly not for those affected with job reduction, since
they are mostly rather old and reluctant to change.
5. The EU Enlargement
The Copenhagen European Council defined membership criteria that the candidates have to meet.
Generally, in the process of integration towards the EU, it is necessary to develop functioning market
economy and capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. In
addition, the candidates have to accept the entire acquis, including competition policy and the EU
criteria for state aid allocation, as well as specific sectoral measures (i.e. secotral acquis). Since the EU
energy market is being liberalised, the alignment process is quite complicated - candidates have to
gradually liberalise market, while keeping it regulated in order to ensure public service.
The energy sector in the EU does not comply with the general economic membership criteria. Namely,
the existence of functioning market economy is assessed on the basis of six elements out of which the
EU energy sector does not fulfil at least two: prices and trade are not liberalised and significant barriers
to market entry are still in place. The second economic membership criterion is the ability to cope with
competitive pressures and with the action of market forces within the Union. Competition, defined as
market condition existing when there is a large number of business all able to supply the same or similar
products to a large number of purchaser, does not exist in most of energy sector. Application of the
competition rules can obstruct of companies required to meet public service interest. Therefore,
liberalisation of the energy sector of the EU is not complete, and provides safeguards (regulation) that
restricts competition and includes public service obligations. Obligations of the public service should be
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defined in a non-discriminatory, transparent and objective manner. Hence it should be clear up to what
extent these obligations could justify restrictions to competition.
However, the issue of ability to cope with competitive pressures and with the action of market forces
within the Union does not require that the pressure exists. The compliance with this criterion is
evaluated on the grounds of several elements, among which the EU energy sector fails to meet four.
These are existence of functioning market economy; the extent to which government policy and
legislation influence competitiveness through trade policy, competition policy, state aids, etc.; the
proportion of small and medium sized enterprises and a sufficient amount, at an appropriate cost, of
human and physical capital, including infrastructure.
The issue of infrastructure was also raised at the Barcelona European Council (15-16 March 2002), as
the EU presidency underlined that liberalising strategies must distinguish two clearly differentiated
aspects: interconnection and effective liberalisation. So by the next spring European Council timetabled
physical interconnection objectives have to be set. The agreed target for Member States of a level of
electricity interconnection equivalent to at least 10% of their installed production capacity by 2005.
Financial requirements should be met mainly by the enterprises involved.
Since the EU energy sector itself is not fully liberalised (yet) the EU does not require full liberalisation
from the candidates during the accession negotiations. But in the energy sector the EU is faster “moving
target” than in most of the other sectors. Namely, while the accession negotiations (which are
provisionally closed with 10 candidates – all but Bulgaria and Romania) on energy were provisionally
closed quite fast (e.g. Latvia and Lithuania opened energy chapter in the first half, and provisionally
closed in the second half of 2001) the latest progress report Commission stipulates that the new member
states will be expected to fulfil the obligations created by the EU acquis – including the new one. Any
permanent derogation will not be accepted (European Commission, 2001).
The accession negotiations have focussed on the public obligations – namely nuclear safety and security
of supply (the constitution of emergency oil stocks) and, to the lesser extent to liberalisation issues
(adopting and implementing gas and electricity directives).
As regards the issue of nuclear energy, the European Union has repeatedly emphasised the importance
of a high level of nuclear safety in candidate countries. The Report on Nuclear Safety in the Context of
Enlargement (European Council, 2001) contains recommendations to all candidate countries to continue
their national safety improvement programmes, including the safe management of spent fuel and
radioactive waste, and regarding the safety of their research reactors.
All candidate countries have responded to these recommendations. During the first half of 2002, a
special Peer Review on nuclear safety assessed the progress made by candidate countries in
implementing all recommendations. According to the Status Report (European Council, 2002) all
candidate countries are clearly committed to fulfil the recommendations.
Building up the necessary oil stock levels posses the problems for most of the candidates, since it
requires a large amounts of investment funding. Therefore the candidates have required transitional
periods: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania until the end of 2009, Poland and Slovakia until the end of 2008,
Cyprus has transitional period until the end of 2007, Malta until the end of 2006 and Czech Republic
and Slovenia until the end of 2005.
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The reform of the EU energy sector which is under way makes it more competitive. The forthcoming
acquis enables application of “regular” economic membership criteria. Therefore, in the view of the EU
enlargement the liberalisation of the energy markets in candidates becomes an issue. Some candidates
have already identified sore points in the alignment process and required transition periods. Czech
Republic was allowed the transitional period for implementation of gas directive until the end of 2004
and Estonia for and electricity directive until 2008. However, still the new acquis puts more pressure on
the EU member states, it is likely that before signing the accession treaty the candidate will be required
to adopt the EU liberalisation timetable. In the “final” negotiations the energy sector issues that are
likely to be raised are those already tackled, but with some additional elements relevant for alignment
with “regular” economic membership criteria. These issues relate to development of on an overall
energy policy with clear timetables for restructuring the sector; preparedness for the internal energy
market - the Gas and Electricity directives; improvement of energy networks in order to create a real
European market.
Although the reform of the EU energy sector makes it more difficult for candidates to align, it also offers
the new perspectives. Adoption and implementation of the new EU acquis in candidate countries
simplifies privatisation and of existing utilities and offers the opportunity for private investors. So, the
application acquis facilitates further improvement in meeting of membership criteria, especially those in
which investment is needed. Private investments have an important role to play in this context and
require a stable investment climate. In the transition economies additional privatisation argument is the
belief that ownership would constrain the power of the state to intervene. Such state interventions
namely might be incompatible either with economic efficiency, or more generally, with satisfactory
operation of decentralised market economies.
Further, most transition economies privatise some of their utilities, particularly as they are amongst the
most valuable commercial assets. In order to be willing to pay more fore these utilities, private investors
have to confidence that their investments will be legally protected and that future tariffs will be regulated
according to the clearly specified and acceptable criteria. Namely, tariff regulation influences return and
risk depends on the period over which the investment is recouped. So the tariff regulation influences the
confidence investor has in his ability to charge cost-reflective prices over the life of investment.
Therefore, in order to attract private capital, legal framework has to be defined in such a way that
investment is sufficiently protected, and that foreign investors are not discriminated against. Becoming
an EU member is quite a proof for that. But the accepting the EU acquis, is then the necessity.
6. Prospects for energy trade after the enlargement
The international and inter-regional energy trade is limited. The physical exchange is limited by
capacity of interconnections. Other barriers to trade are imports restrictions (justified by public service
concerns, such as environmental and safety standards, lack of open access to grids) and uncertain
investment condition, underdeveloped organisational structures, lack of co-ordination and settlement
rules. The EU enlargement will not per se improve the situation. However, the prospect of becoming the
EU member gives incentives for faster reforms. Therefore the candidates are likely to implement the EU
rules as required. This will alleviating the inter-regional trade barriers between the present and new
member states. This should lead to trade creation and expansion. Since the trade with third countries is
already very limited, excessive trade diversion is not likely. However, it is possible that trade patterns
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that will develop do not reflect the optimal allocation of resources.
In the short to medium run development of trade will be limited by capacity. But the liberalisation of
East-West energy trade is in the mutual interest of traders (e.g. Russia and the EU). Development and
application of transparency and non-discrimination principles within the enlarged EU will incite
investments. Energy trade in that sense can underpin the multilateral trading system and help ensuring
common energy security interest and sustainable economic development.
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The paper focuses on the liberalisation of electricity sector. Some is-
sues of the gas sector are also discussed, but in less details.
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The consumers that meet these criteria become “eligible”, i.e. they have formally the right to choose sup-
plier.
For these acts co-decision procedure is applied. The Economic and Social Committee issued
its opinion in October 2001. The European Parliament in its first reading adopted a series
of amendments on the proposal in March 2002. The Council also proposed changes to the
Commission proposal. Barcelona European Council in March 2002 urged the parties concerned
to adopt the proposed directive and regulation as soon as possible in the course of 2002.
UK and the Netherlands launched a study on energy liberalisation indicators in Europe. Pre-
liminary report was published in 2000 (DG Tren, 2001). The Commission through Euro-
stat is establishing a series of indicators to monitor functioning of electricity market. Cri-
teria I use here are based on the elements used in the Commission’s staff working paper
“Completing the internal energy market” and the method the Commission uses for evaluation
compliance of the candidates with the EU membership criteria, which are discussed later.
However, it does not mean that the gas market in these countries is not
opened. Gas companies in France and Germany have voluntary pub-
lished the main commercial conditions for providing access to their network
This assessment is quite limited. The other elements, such as contained in Ox-
era’s proposal (DG TREN,2000) should be taken into consideration in-depth anal-
ysis. These elements should include elements that are related to the different ar-
eas of supply chain, i.e. generation markets, wholesale markets, customer supply.
However, the price levels change not only because of liberalisation, but also
the change in fuel costs and fuel mix can affect price development.
In the gas sector the main obstacles are the same as in electricity sector. The high net-
work tariffs in electricity corresponds to the network access tariffs based on distance, and
point to point capacity reservation and the high network tariffs in gas sectors. Balanc-
ing regime in electricity corresponds to balancing and storage regime in gas sector.
This approach is clearly reflected in the electricity Directive, which pro-
vides for a mechanism enabling member states to pursue public policy con-
siderations, and was also considered during the accession negotiations.
In case of the EU enlargement, provided that electricity market integrates,
the CEE dependence on Russian gas would decrease (Balmaceda, 2002.)
UCTE (Union for Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity) saves between 3-10% overall
investment and operation costs thanks to regional interconnection.
For instance, the creation of trade raises issue of congestion resulting from unscheduled elec-
tricity flows. Such congestion can cause the network failure and decrease security of sup-
ply. This can be solved by sharing information (e.g. a day ahead information).
These are :
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  Equilibrium between demand and supply is established by the free interplay of market forces;
prices, as well as trade, are liberalised;
  Significant barriers to market entry (establishment of new firms) and exit (bankruptcies, liquida-
tions) are absent;
  The legal system, including the regulation of property rights is in place; laws and contracts can be
enforced;
  Macro-economic stability has been achieved including adequate price stability and sustainable pub-
lic finances and external accounts;
  Broad consensus about the essentials of economic policy:
  The financial sector is sufficiently well developed to channel savings towards productive invest-
ment.
The EU common position is that the measures put into place for the achievement of public service
objectives should not restrict trade and competition more than necessary.
Nuclear safety issue concerns improvement the safety of nuclear power plants in order to ensure that
electricity is produced according to a high level of nuclear safety; and the high level of responsibility
when handling the radioactive waste.
EU requires stock level sufficient for 90 day of consumption
From the economic point of view, the major limit for energy trade has been disguised picture of com-
parative advantage. Present energy prices in the FSU and CEE have been traditionally determined on
the basis of average costs, and in the market economies on the basis of long-run marginal costs. (Rus-
sian energy prices, taxes, and costs, 1993., p. 70). The Energy Charter Treaty requires introducing the
market-oriented pricing. It is one of the three main ECT principles (the other tow are the principle of
state sovereignty and sovereign rights over natural resources and the principle of non-discrimination).
Prices of energy are not determined on the demand-supply basis. Price risk is often re-
duced (in project financing) by take-or pay contracts, where buyer agrees to pay a min-
imum price for goods or service whether or not they end up actually taking them.
This was also recognised as an issue in the framework of the European Energy Charter Treaty. The
Trade amendment to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) of April 1998 specified conditions for applying
most favoured nation treatment (MFN) and national treatment (NT) to the sale or other divestment of
state assets (privatisation) and to the dismantling of monopolies (demonopolisation).
This is agreed in Understanding 10 in respect to treacle 10(4) of the original ECT
1
12
